Dr. EDWARDS's

SERMON

AT THE

Commencement

AT

CAMBRIDGE.

D. EDWARDS

SERMON

LATE

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AT

CAMBRIDGE.

Cam. d. 699. 5

THE *Eternal and Intrinsick Reasons* OF GOOD and EVIL.

A SERMON

PREACH'D at the COMMENCEMENT AT CAMBRIDGE,

On SUNDAY the 2*d* Day of *July*, 1699.

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By JOHN EDWARDS, D. D.

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PSALM cxix. cxlij.

Thy Righteouſneſs is an Everlaſting Righteouſneſs, and thy Law is the Truth.

IT is not to be doubted that the Subject of this *Pſalm* is the *Moral Law*, or the Precepts of Juſt and Righteous Living, which are contain'd in the *Ten Commandments*, and which we find interſperſed in *Moſes*'s Writings, eſpecially in the Book of *Deuteronomy*. The Royal Prophet directing here his words to God, calls theſe *his Righteouſneſs* and *his Law*, and he adds that this Righteouſneſs is *Everlaſting*, and that this Law is *the Truth*. The moſt eaſy and obvious meaning of the former clauſe of which words is this, that this Divine Law which he is ſpeaking of, had its Exiſtence from Everlaſting, it was alwaies what it is now. Which is of the ſame import of what he ſaith in the 160. ℣. of this *Pſalm*, *Thy Word is True from the beginning*, *i. e.* from Everlaſting, for theſe two are ſynonymous, as appears from *Prov.* 8. 23. The Rules and Meaſures of what is Juſt and Right were determin'd and fix'd from Eternity. And beſides, they are of Perpetual and Eternal Obligation, they are ſuch Laws as ſhall never be repeal'd: whence our *Pſalmiſt* ſaith in another place, *All God's Commandments*

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are ſure, they ſtand faſt for ever and ever. Pſ. 111. 7, 8. For what is Good or Evil in its own nature, can at no time, or upon any account be alter'd. Which brings me to the Interpretation of the latter Clauſe of the Words, *Thy Law is the Truth, i. e.* theſe Rules of Moral Righteouſneſs muſt needs be Immutable and Perpetual, becauſe they are no imaginary and precarious things, nor do they depend upon humane Inſtitution and Arbitrement; but they are Real and True in themſelves, they are Solid and Subſtantial, there being an Intrinſick Goodneſs and Excellency in them. On this account they have *Subſiſtence* and *Reality*, and therefore may properly and ſtrictly be ſaid *to be*, and *to be True*. Which is a Notion that a Profound Man among the *Gentiles* had long ſince attain'd to; for he tells us, that the Law of Nature or True Morality is * *the finding of being*.

* Τῦ ὄντος ἕυρεσις. Socrat. apud Platonem.

This then is the Propoſition that I will Entertain you with at preſent, that the Reaſons of Good and Evil are Eternal and Unchangeable; that there are ſuch things as Right and Wrong, without any Poſitive Law or Conſtitution; that theſe had the ſtart of all human Contracts and Cuſtoms; and, in ſhort, that Religion and Virtue are ingrafted in our very Nature, and are every waies ſuited to the frame of Rational Creatures. This I will evince 1. From the Nature of God. 2. From what we find in the Mind of Man. 3. From the Behaviour and Actions of Mankind. 4. From the Univerſal Conſent of the World.

1. *God's Nature* or *Mind* is the Eternal Foundation of Goodneſs and Righteouſneſs, and therefore theſe

these cannot but be Real and Eternal. It is certain that the *Essential Bonity*, which is in Mens Actions, is grounded on the *Chief Good*, that which *Plato* frequently calls * *Goodness it self, and the Idea and Pattern of all Goodness*. For whence could Goodness be fetch'd, but from this Divine Source? It could neither be deriv'd from Angels nor Men, (and we can't think of any rank of Beings else whence there is a probability of its being deriv'd) because they themselves are from God, and therefore it would be unreasonable to think, that that which is Best in them was not from Him. Yea, from Him alone it must necessarily be, in whose Perfect Nature the Ideas and Platforms of it were from Eternal Ages: for as the Ideas of *Truth* were eternally Existent in God's *Understanding*, so his *Will* was pregnant and replenish'd with Goodness and Holiness. Which is a Notion that we cannot but form of the Divine Being, because he being *most Perfect*, we can't possibly conceive of him without apprehensions of both these, *viz.* his Understanding fraught with Truth, and his Will with Goodness. Now, from this Eternal Fountain the Goodness and Righteousness of Men have their Original, and consequently they can't but be Real and True, and have an inward worth in them, because whatever partakes of the Divine Nature and Perfection is really worthy and excellent. It is then the holy Nature of the Divine Being that is the prime Source, as well as Rule of human sanctity and righteousness. It is this on which they depend, for it is the Pattern of them. Goodness in us is but a Copy of that Original, that Essential and Im-

* Αὐτόκαλον, Αὐτοαγαθὸν, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα. De Leg. & alibi.

mutable Goodneſs, which is in the Supreme Good. This is the true Root of all Rectitude, Juſtice and Righteouſneſs. The Eternal Laws of Juſt and Good, which are in the Divine Mind, are the Pillars on which the Moral Goodneſs of Rational Beings is founded. Hence it is that the Laws of Good and Evil, of Juſt and Unjuſt among Men, are in their own nature firm and ſolid, and never to be aboliſh'd, for they are eternally Good, and grounded on the unchangeableneſs of the Supreme Being. The Reaſons of them did exiſt from Eternity in the Divine Nature, and they were ever conformable to the upright Will of God, and for that Reaſon cannot be otherwiſe. Thus it appears, that Moral Righteouſneſs being originally founded in the Being and Nature of God, muſt conſequently be Immutable.

2. The Intrinſick and unchangeable Nature of it is demonſtrated, not only from our tracing it up to its Firſt Head, but from its being ſeated by God in the *Mind* of Man. For *this* is the very Image and Pourtraiture of God himſelf, and conſequently, ſeeing *Truth* and *Goodneſs* are Eſſential to the Divine Nature (as was ſaid before) theſe Excellencies are alſo inſeparable from the *Soul* of Man. And therefore from the Nature of human Souls, as ſuch, it were eaſy to prove that there were Innate Notions, not only of *True* and *Falſe*, but of *Good* and *Evil*, imprinted on them at their firſt make. And tho' we have not the *uſe* of theſe Original Notions preſently, or in our Infancy and Childhood (as ſome urge) yet it is ridiculous to infer thence, that they are not in the Soul: for on the ſame ground

it

it might be prov'd, that a Man hath no *Rational Soul* for ſeveral years, becauſe the Faculties of it do not actually exert themſelves. But we are ſure that thoſe Mental Impreſſions were in all Men from the beginning, becauſe they are the Firſt Emanations of their natural frame, as they are Reaſonable Beings, and as their Souls reſemble the Divinity. Hence it follows, as a clear and inconteſtible Truth, that, tho' by the early Apoſtacy of the Firſt Man our human Nature is deprav'd, our Faculties are corrupted, and we have an inward proclivity to what is vicious, ſo that it is the work of the *Holy Spirit* to enable us to do any Good that can be acceptable to God: yet there are remaining in us, as we are Human Creatures and Rational Agents, Natural Principles and Sentiments of Morality. And therefore we may obſerve, that One, who is an unqueſtionable Aſſerter of the original depravity of Mankind, is yet very poſitive in this, that * *there is in the Souls of Men a Senſe of Divinity and Religion, and that even by a Natural Inſtinct*; and accordingly he ſpends a whole Chapter to prove the exiſtence of this Inbred Principle in the Minds of all Men. And truly, every Man alive, that is attentive and unprejudiced, may feel this in him as ſoon as he is arrived to the uſe of Reaſon, (for he can't exſpect it ſhould actually diſplay it ſelf till then) or whenever he hath occaſion given him to exerciſe his thoughts concerning Moral and Divine things. To this the Great Apoſtle refers in *Rom.* 2. 14, 15. when he tells us, that *the Gentiles who have not the Law*, (*i. e.* the written Law) *do by nature* (*i. e.* by vertue of theſe radical notions of

* Quendam ineſſe humanæ menti, & quidem naturali inſtinctu, divinitatis Senſum, extra controverſiam ponimus. *Calvin.* Inſtit. l. 1. c. 3. Omnibus inditum eſſe divinitus Religionis ſemen experientia teſtatur. Ibid. c. 4.

of Moral Goodneſs in their minds) *the things contain'd in the Law*, they are puſh'd on to it by this Natural Principle within them. Hence it is that tho' *they have not the Law*, yet *they are a Law unto themſelves*, becauſe they have this inward Law in their own minds, which inſtructs them what to do, as to the great duties of Natural Religion. Therefore he adds, that *they ſhew the work of the Law written in their hearts*, namely in theſe Original Characters by God's own hand. So that nothing could be ſaid more plainly to Eſtabliſh theſe inward Signatures and Impreſſes of Goodneſs on the Soul.

And they were Engraven there for *Great* and *Excellent Purpoſes* in the life of Man: whence we may further evince, that there are *indeed* ſuch Inbred Principles and Notions. There being ſo many waies of Deluſion and Error in the World, ſuch a diverſity of avocations from Religion and Goodneſs, and the Worſhip of the Divine Being, and ſuch Charming Temptations every where to a vitious Life; it was requiſite there ſhould be ſuch *Inward Directors* as theſe in Mens breaſts. There being ſuch Impediments to Truth and Goodneſs as Paſſion, Prejudice, Intereſt, Pleaſures, and theſe continually operating upon us; it was neceſſary there ſhould be ſomething within us to remind us of what is True and what is Good, ſomething within us that oppoſes it ſelf to all the foreſaid obſtacles and hindrances. There was a neceſſity that there ſhould be a Divine Principle in our Souls, which ſhould be as it were a continual *Fund* to our Conſciences; alwaies to ſupply and furniſh them

with Virtuous dictates. Amongſt the moſt rude and barbarous People it is *This* that keeps up ſome kind of Notion of Honeſty and Goodneſs. Yea, and among thoſe that are Civiliz'd, theſe would be in danger of being loſt, if there were not this Principle rooted in their minds. All that is Juſt and Right would have been baniſh'd out of the World, unleſs this prevalent Inmate had acted its part, and kept us from being wholly bereft of them. We had long ſince been abſorpt of Atheiſm and Profaneſs, if this had not powerfully ſecur'd us. Were it not for this active Spark, the Fire of Virtue would have been extinguiſh'd, and it would have been impoſſible to preſerve it in the midſt of that Deluge of Vice, which hath broken in upon us. God took care therefore, that there ſhould be ingrafted in the heart of every Man, learned or illiterate, theſe Moral Impreſſions which I am ſpeaking of, which will not ſuffer Mankind to be wholly alienated from a ſenſe of what is Good and Virtuous. It may be attributed to this, that, notwithſtanding the General Depravation and Corruption, there is yet a Face of Religion in the World. For it is an undoubted Truth, that *This* buoys up Goodneſs when it is ſinking, this ſupports it when it is falling, this keeps it alive when it is even exſpiring. So abſolutely *neceſſary* was the implanting of *theſe Notions* in Mens minds from their very birth. And then (which is the thing I have been proving) theſe Innate Principles of Good and Evil thus implanted in us, are a certain and unqueſtionable eviction of the Intrinſick Excellency of Moral Religion, and of all Virtuous and Juſt Actions,

which

which are but Tranſcripts and Exemplifications of thoſe Original Conceptions placed by God in the minds of Men.

3. As the real and unchangeable nature of Moral Righteouſneſs is proved from its conformity to the Supreme and Eternal Good, and from the Images of Good, which our minds are furniſh'd with from our birth, ſo it may be evidenc'd from the conſtant *Behaviour and Practice of Mankind* afterwards. This I will make appear from theſe following particulars, 1. From Mens excuſing their ſins. 2. From their deſiring Secrecy when they commit them. 3. From the Regrets and Remorſes which they feel afterwards. 4. From the Fear of Puniſhment which haunts them. 5. From that Diſlike and Hatred which even Bad men themſelves have of Vice.

Firſt, the Intrinſick Excellency of Vertue is manifeſted from mens *Excuſing* their ſins and vitious practiſes, and devolving them upon others. This was in the World as ſoon as Sin it ſelf. *Adam* would needs caſt his Tranſgreſſion and Guilt upon his Relative, and ſhe put it off to the *Serpent*. This hath been the practice of ſinners ever ſince: tho' they know themſelves to be really Criminal, yet they endeavour to throw off their faults, and they uſe all ſorts of palliations and pretences to clear themſelves; and particularly they are wont to uſurp the Names and Titles of Virtue to conceal their evil deeds, fondly diſguiſing theſe latter under a ſhew and reſemblance of the former. But whilſt they do ſo, they confeſs, that *Virtue* is Excellent and Laudable, otherwiſe they would not emulate the likeneſs of it: and they acknowledge, that *Vice*

is in it self base and reproachful, and that the rational nature of Man is averse to it, else they would not excuse it, and shift it off: nay, 'tis certain they would own it, if it were Good and praise worthy. But they have natural convictions of the contrary, which makes them strive to clear themselves of it: and these evasions are a palpable proof that Vice is a thing opposite to the reasonable frame of their Souls, and is of its own nature Evil, and that there is a distinction between Just and Unjust, Right and Wrong, founded in the nature of things.

Again, this also appears from men's desiring of *Secrecy* when they commit sins, and after they have committed them. For though one reason of their sculking and absconding is, because they would not be defeated in what they undertake, or be detected when it is performed; yet this is another reason of their affecting of privacy, namely, because they are *ashamed* to act those vile things in the Eyes of the World. Vice is so ugly and deformed, that they would not have it seen: and when it is, they blush and are confounded at their own evil doings. Which is signify'd to us in that Expostulation *Rom.* 6. 21. *What profit had ye in those things whereof ye are now ashamed?* This blushing argues an inward turpitude in vitious actions: whereas Virtue, which is Good in it self, is daring, and carries Confidence with it. If there were not a real blemish and stain in unjust and lewd practises, why should men be ashamed of them? Why should they be put out of countenance, and look like Malefactors? Why should they fly to their Coverts, and run into corners, and fear a discovery? There was an early

Example of this in the first Sinners, they retired, and *hid themselves*, *Gen.* 3. 8. On which an Antient and Pious Father of the Christian Church hath these remarkable words, * *Why did* Adam, *after he had sinned, hide himself, seeing at that time there was no written Law? The Reason was, because he had a natural inbred knowledge that he had done ill, he being self-instructed in the knowledge of Virtue.* And thence arose in him that inward bashfulness and dejection of Soul after the commission of Sin, and thence he fondly attempted to hide not only himself, but his Crime from God. And it is observable that *Cain* refus'd to discover his murdering of his Brother; when God demanded of him where he was, his surly reply was, *he knew not*, *Gen.* 4. 9. Which concealing of Vice argues the intrinsick Evil of it, for why else is it mask'd with privacy and retirement, and kept from the knowledge of others as much as it is possible, yea even of those sometimes that can't hurt us? This is an argument that Virtue is good and lovely, and that the contrary is vile and detestable, and that the mind of Man naturally approves of Moral Goodness, and dislikes Vice and Immorality.

* S. Chrysost. Hom. 12. ad Pop. Antioch.

Further, the *Regrets* and *Remorses* of Sinners for their acting contrary to the Divine Laws, are certain Testimonies of this Truth. Why do they call themselves to an account, and arraign, and pass Sentence upon themselves for what they have done? Why are they uneasy and dissatisfy'd, and find an unspeakable Trouble in their minds? Is not this from Natural Conscience, and those inbred impressions, which are in the Soul of every Man? Yes, without doubt, these cause them to rebuke and chastise

chaſtiſe themſelves, and that very ſeverely, when they offend againſt theſe inward dictates. Thence come thoſe Vexations and Torments which willful Tranſgreſſors feel in their breaſts, yea tho' their faults be kept ſecret, and none knows them but themſelves. Notwithſtanding this, they are troubled and diſquieted, and as the *Satyriſt* well remarks of ſuch men,

Tacitâ ſudant præcordia culpâ. * *Juv.* Sat. 11.

But eſpecially the more open and profligate Sinners have frequent experience of theſe inward Inquietudes, Sweatings and Agonies, which render them a Plague and Torment to themſelves. *Cain* complain'd, that *his iniquity* (for ſo the original word ſhould be rendred) *was greater than he could bear*, *Gen.* 4. 13. That is, the guilt of his heinous Sin became an inſupportable burden to him. So *Judas*, from the horror of his guilt, ſunk into deſpair. And who ſees not that the uſual effects of great and flagitious enormities are Pain and Torture of mind, Deliquiums of Soul and Body, and the waſting and macerating of the fleſh and ſpirits, by continual reſtleſneſs and diſturbance? The ground of it is obvious, for Sin is a violent diſtorting of the natural and primitive temper of Man, and therefore it cannot but create extreme anguiſh and perturbation. One reaſon why men are diſpleas'd with themſelves after the commiſſion of what is Immoral, is becauſe they find they have acted contrary to their Native Principle, becauſe they have done ſomething that is unſuitable to the rational nature which they are endued with. It appears hence that Sin is naturally

Evil, and that it is an affront to our Reaſons and Underſtandings to tranſgreſs the Laws of Morality. Thus a Man's own mind eſtabliſhes the Equity and Goodneſs of theſe Laws, and convinces him that the Foundations of Moral Righteouſneſs are ſure and ſtable.

Moreover, this may be made evident from *the Fear of Puniſhment*, which haunts and poſſeſſes the minds of Evil men. Thus *Cain*, the firſt Murderer, was afraid that *every one that found him would ſlay him:* he had a perpetual dread of the fatal recompence, which was the merit of his villany. And Natural Conſcience tells all other Sinners that they deſerve Puniſhment: *they know the Judgment of God, that they who commit ſuch things, are worthy of death*, as the Apoſtle ſpeaks: and this knowledge unavoidably breeds Fear and Dread. Some would needs perſuade us that this Paſſion is rais'd by Politick Heads, by Wiſe Rulers and Governours, merely to aw their daſtard Subjects: but it is evident that this is a falſity, becauſe Princes and Rulers themſelves are liable to theſe impreſſions; nay, we know they actually have been under the force and prevalency of ſuch Principles. *Belſhazar* the Great Babylonian Monarch fell into fits of ſhaking and trembling, when the Hand-writing on the Wall put him in mind of his Profaneſs and Debauchery, and the juſt Deſerts of both. King *Herod* after the murder of *John Baptiſt* was reſtleſs in his mind, and had the terrible ſight of that Holy Man continually repreſented to his fancy, and * *he thought he was riſen from the dead*, and was come to Torment him. *Tiberius* the Emperour was not able to con-

* Mat. 14. 2.

ceal

ceal the terrors and affrightments of his Conſcience, after all his unnatural Luſts and Cruelties. *Nero* after all his prodigious villanies could not diſſemble his horrors, and his being haunted with Spirits, and tormented with Furies and Flames. Which plainly ſhews, that this dread of mind is no Politick Invention, no Feigned Paſſion and Repreſentation, no idle Phantom or Mormo; but that it is a real thing, and flows from the natural dictates of the Mind, and not theſe from Fear, as ſome would ſuggeſt. Why ſhould Men be affraid of the Divine Being, if they deſerv'd not his Diſpleaſure? And how can they deſerve it, unleſs they have done ſomething amiſs, *i. e.* broken ſome Law, which they were oblig'd to keep? There muſt then be ſome obligation on Man from *Nature* to obſerve ſuch and ſuch Laws: for I ſpeak even of thoſe who have thrown off all Obligations but this. Their being conſcious to themſelves that they have not acted as they ought, and that thereby they are become guilty, creates this Timerouſneſs and Dread in them, and gives them an apprehenſion of the great Day of Doom.

In the next place I argue from that *diſlike* and *hatred*, which even Bad men themſelves have of ſome *Vices*, and from that great *Eſteem* which they have of ſome *Virtues*. *Pride* is univerſally diſreliſh'd, and the very Perſons who cheriſh it in themſelves, abhor it in others. Nothing is more generally abominated than a Proud and Arrogant Man; and on the contrary, nothing is more valu'd, lov'd, and careſs'd than one that is *Humble* and *Meek*. Even thoſe very Perſons, whoſe practice is a remonſtrance

againſt Humility, have at the ſame time an inward liking of this Virtue, yea and outwardly expreſs their approbation of it. The *Avaritious* and *Sordid Niggard* is ſcorn'd and laught at by every one: but the *Liberal* and *Generous* are applauded by all. *Clean* and *Chaſt Diſcourſe* meets with an univerſal acceptance: but *Obſcenity* and *Ribaldry*, tho' dreſs'd in the Garb of Wit, are generally nauſeous and offenſive, and the Organ of Hearing is as 'twere diſoblig'd, and even hurt by them; and oftentimes the Hearer bluſhes, becauſe the Speaker doth not. A *Lyar* is a Title of the greateſt reproach and infamy among men: a *lying Tongue* is not only one of thoſe things which * *the Lord hateth*, but 'tis as † odious to all Men: whereas a *Plain* and *Open Speaking*, without any diſſimulation or reſerve, is a very graceful and amiable thing, and nothing is more valu'd and commended in the World. Again, *Oppreſſion*, *Violence*, *Rapine*, *Perſecution*, and eſpecially if theſe proceed to *Bloodſhed* and *Slaughter*, are hated of all Perſons, yea of thoſe who practice theſe Vices moſt of all. *Julius Cæſar* had ever in his mouth that of *Euripides*, ‡ *If Right at all may be violated, it muſt be for the ſake of a Crown; but in other matters let us be exactly juſt.* The greateſt Invaders acknowledge Juſtice to be good, and it is Intereſt only that warps their judgment. The *Banditi* and *Rapparees* rob for mere Gain, and even *Aſſaſſines* and *Ruffians* muſt be well paid to do their work; which ſhews there is no temptation in the Thing it ſelf. A *Common Thief* had rather find than take away another Man's goods; and whilſt he doth the latter, he diſapproves of it. Or ſay, that he approves

* Prov. 6. 17.

† Τὸ γὰρ ψεύδεσθαι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μισεῖσθαι ἄξιον. *Plutarch.* de Educat. Pueror.

‡ *Sueton.* in *Jul. Cæſ.*

proves of it in himself, yet he deteſteth it in all others. So *Perfidiouſneſs* and *Treachery* meet with a Catholick abhorrence; and thoſe who reward theſe practiſes, yet hate the things themſelves, and the Actors of them are alwaies odious in the World, and ſometimes ſignally puniſh'd by them who ſet them on work. But *Faithfulneſs*, *Sincerity*, *Honeſty*, *Frankneſs* and *True-heartedneſs* are belov'd by all Men. And it were eaſy to ſhew in other Inſtances, that Vicious and Immoral Actions are loathed even by Sinners themſelves, and that they who dare not practice Wiſdom and Virtue, yet * praiſe and commend it, and are willing to ſee it thrive in the world. Thus from the *Behaviour* and *deportment* of Men, even thoſe who are of the worſt ſort, it is evident that Virtue is praiſe-worthy in its own Nature, and that there is an inward Principle in all Men, that makes them pay reſpect to Goodneſs and Honeſty, and to diſparage what is vicious and unlawful.

In the laſt place, I will prove the Laws of Moral Goodneſs to be Intrinſick and Natural from their being *univerſally receiv'd*. For that of *Tully* is an unqueſtionable Maxim, † *When all People agree in a thing, we are to look upon it as the Law of Nature.* Now, it is evident that there is among all Men an Agreement, as to the main, about the Notion of Good and Evil. Juſt and Right are every where, and among all Perſons the ſame, as *Fire burns here and in Perſia*, (to uſe the words of the famous ‡ *Stagyrite.*) We are told by *Valerius Maximus*, that the very Barbarous *Scythians* took care of their Fathers Tombs, and religiouſly preſerv'd them; where-

* Neque enim unquam in tantum convaleſcet nequitia, numquam ſic contra virtutes conjurabitur, ut non Sapientiæ nomen venerabile & ſacrum maneat. *Sen.* Epiſt. 14.

† Conſenſio omnium gentium jus naturæ putanda eſt. Tuſc. Q. l. 1.

‡ Ethic. l. 5. c. 7.

whereupon he makes this seasonable Remark, * *Nature, the first and the best of things, is the Mistress of Piety, so that we need not be taught and instructed in it.* And again in the same place, *Solid Virtue is born with us rather than made and fashion'd.* And indeed it must needs be so, because the notices and impressions of Good and Evil on Mens minds are *Universal*: and it is impossible they should be otherwise, because they are *Natural*, for Nature universally spreads it self in every individual. Hence is that *Common Consent* in all Men concerning the grand Points of Morality: they are voted to be Reasonable and Just, by the whole Assembly of mankind throughout the World.

* Prima & optima rerum Natura pict tis est magistra, quæ nullo vocis ministerio, nullo usu literarum indigens, propriis ac tacitis viribus charitatem parentum pectoribus liberorum infundit. lib. 5. c. 4. Solida virtus nascitur magis quàm fingitur.

I know this is oppos'd by the Learned Mr † *Selden*, and some others, especially of late, who hold that *Universal Consent* is no argument to prove the Law of Nature. Or rather, they say, there is no such thing as Universal Consent, there being so many various Opinions and Practises in Morality and Religion. But I desire these following things may be consider'd, which will fully answer the suggestions of those who oppose this doctrine. First, I grant that God hath judicially given over some People to a reprobate sense, and that because *they* have given *themselves* over first to their Lusts, and have willfully shut their Eyes against the light. Hence it is that they have in many things corrupted and distorted the Law of Nature, and then it is no wonder, that they have been permitted to fall into the most irrational practises, as that of Idolatry, and the like.

† De Jure Nat. & Gent. l. 1. c. 6, 7.

But I add next, that this Corruption is not in the

the *First* and *General Principles* of Nature, but in ſome undue *Inferences* and *Deductions* thence. Thus in the caſe of *Polytheiſm* or *Idolatry*, which is the adoring of Falſe Gods, and was ever a Catholick crime among the common ſort of Heathens, there is the *General* dictate of Natural Religion kept up, *viz.* the worſhipping of a Deity, though they are ſo ignorant and corrupted as to conclude this and the other thing to be a God, tho' they are not. So there is no Man or Nation extant, who think it lawfull to *hurt* or *injure* any one: but there is ſome diſagreement as to the *Particular Inferences*, which may ariſe from theſe Premiſes; and in ſome particular Inſtances, *that* may be thought by ſome to be hurtful and injurious, which is not deemed ſo by others. And thus thoſe Uſages among *Barbarous* Nations, which are ſo far different from ours, may be reconcil'd, as namely, their eating the dead, in ſtead of burying them; and their diſpatching their old ſick Parents out of the World, which they look upon as a Courteſy done to them, and ſeveral the like practiſes. In which the firſt and general Principles of Morality are not violated, but only ſome falſe Concluſions are drawn from them. Notwithſtanding which, the main and eſſential Laws of Good and Evil are the ſame, and are own'd to be ſo.

Again, with particular relation to Mr *Selden's Objection* (which a late Writer hath borrow'd from him, and makes great uſe of) *viz.* That there is no Natural and Univerſal Law of Morality, becauſe the *Gentiles* are ſo vicious, and act ſo contrary to the light of Reaſon; I anſwer, that when I aſſert

the Law of Nature to be Universal, I mean, that it prevails among all Men in the World that are of *sound minds*, and who carefully *attend to* the dictates of Natural Conscience, and who *use* their Understandings, and make Reflections, and exercise their Faculties. But if there be some (and too many there are) who are stupid and sottish, and attend not to the Inbred Notions of their minds, (whereby these Notions are in a manner defaced, and almost extinguish'd) I am not to answer for these. When I speak of *Universal Consent*, I understand it of those that think and consider, and are not wont to debauch and distemper their Reasons, as those Rude and Savage *Gentiles* do. Wherefore we are not at all concern'd for the *Brasilians* or *Caribes*, no nor for the *Soldanians* and *Hotentots*, with the noise of whom our Ears are mightily grated of late. The strange behaviour of these People is no real reproach to Human Nature, nor any impeachment of the General Laws of Morality, which all People agree in who rouze their inward Principle, and give heed to it. And thence I gather that the Precepts of Virtue are immovable and unalterable, for they are fix'd and riveted into the very Nature of mankind, or else there would not be an *Universal Agreement* about them.

I might go on to farther Proofs of the Intrinsick Nature of Good and Evil, from those *Absurd Consequences*, which would follow from the contrary. *First*, if there be no such thing, and if, notwitstanding what hath been alledged, Virtue and Vice are casual and contingent, then our Faculties were given us to cheat and abuse us, and they are continually

impos'd

impos'd upon, and that about their proper Objects: which is a doctrine that would destroy even a *Deity*, and we could say nothing to prove there is such a Being. Or, allowing a God, it would be a reproach to his Goodness and Wisdom, to bestow such mental Powers upon us as are constantly deceiv'd, and to implant such Notions in the Souls of all Men as are false and erroneous, and which have nothing real and solid in them.

Secondly, this also would be a Consequence from the premises, that we may live and act as we please: for if there be no fix'd Laws and Rules of Goodness and Righteousness, then nothing can be said to be Lawful, and consequently nothing can be said to be Unlawful: or what is Lawful to day, may be Unlawful to morrow. For if there be not any Inward Reason of the Moral Laws enjoin'd us by God, if they be not in themselves, and in their abstract nature Good; he may prescribe us other Laws, and those contrary to these which we now have; and so God may command us to hate him, and to hurt and mischief our neighbours. If these things are not intrinsically evil, so that they can never be Good, they may in time become our Duty.

Thirdly, this is another Consequence, that our *Happiness* would be precarious and uncertain: for the Happiness of Rational Creatures depends on the Goodness of their Actions. And by this means we should be wholly unacquainted with the Great *End* of our lives, which is the thing that is to steer us in this World, and to direct us in all we undertake. These are some of the egrègious Blunders and monstrous *Absurdities* which attend the contra-

ry Opinion, and may ſerve to confirm us in this weighty Point, that there is an Intrinſick Goodneſs in Virtuous actions, and an Intrinſick Evil in Vitious ones, and that the Reaſons of both are congenite to our Rational Nature, and flow from it, and are ever agreeable to it.

Thus I have Eſtabliſh'd the Doctrine which I undertook to diſcourſe of. And it was neceſſary to do it, becauſe tho' the generality of mankind (as was ſaid before) do unanimouſly averr, that Goodneſs is not plac'd in the arbitrary opinions of Men, but in nature it ſelf; yet there have been of old, and are at this day thoſe who contradict and oppoſe it. The Antient *Scepticks* were infamous for this, who had learnt of their Maſter *Pyrrho*, that there is † no difference between Good and Evil by *Nature*, but only by *Laws* and *Cuſtom*. *Laertius* acquaints us, that it was the poſitive opinion of one of that ſort of Men, that a Wiſe Man will not ſtick to commit Sacriledge, or Adultery, or to Steal, whenever he hath a fit opportunity; for * none of theſe (ſaith he) have any Turpitude in them in their own nature, if we can but lay aſide the vulgar apprehenſion concerning them, which the rabble of Fools and Ignorant People have taken up. *Tully* teſtifies concerning the *Epicureans*, that they held *Honeſt* and *Juſt* to be ‡ *caſſum quiddam, & inani vocis ſono decoratum*, a vain and frivolous thing, ſet forth and commended to the World by a mere empty ſound of words. This alſo was the Sentiment of ſome that pretended to be *Chriſtians*, as the *Gnoſticks*, and eſpecially *Carpocrates*, who was a Great Man with that party: he with much earneſt-

† *Laert.* in vit. *Pyrrh.*

* Μηδὲν δὲ εἶναι τούτων ἰσχὺν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐθῶν δόξης διεφθάρης, &c. *Laert.* in *Ariſtip.*

‡ Tuſc. Q. lib. 5.

earneſtneſs avow'd, that all * Moral actions are indifferent, and that all the Good or Evil that is ſaid to be in them, is founded not on truth, but fancy, as *Theodoret* bears witneſs concerning him, and quotes *Irenæus* for it.

But to come down lower, they have, it ſeems, a power in the Church of *Rome* to change the nature of Vice and Virtue. It is agreed on by the the chiefeſt Writers of that Communion, that the *Pope* hath ſuch a *Plenitude of Power*, that he can diſpenſe with Juſt and Right, and any Law of God, excepting only the Articles of Faith. So ſaith the *Gloſſe* upon the Canon Law, and *Panormitan* approves of it. *Bellarmine*, their Great Champion, ſpeaks home to the buſineſs, † If the *Pope* (ſaith he) could erre ſo far as to command the practice of Vice, and to forbid the practice of Virtue, the Church in that caſe is oblig'd, unleſs it would ſin againſt Conſcience, to believe Vice to be Good, and Virtue to be Evil. Judge now whether the Reaſons of Good and Evil be not taken away by the Church of *Rome*, when it can alter the property of Virtue and Vice, and when their People are bound in Conſcience to take one for the other. Judge whether they do not aſcribe more to their Great *Pontif* than can be attributed to God himſelf: for certainly it is ſo far from being in the power of any Man to alter the Natural and Moral Law, and to take away the obligation of it, that it is not within the verge of Divine Power it ſelf. It is the deciſion of the Famous *Grotius* (who is alwaies very wary when he ſpeaks concerning *what God can do*, as indeed it doth become us: yet it is the peremptory de-

* Ἀδιάφορα ὄντα, κατὰ τὴν δόξαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων —— οὐδενὸς φύσει κακοῦ ὑπάρχον ⊙. —— δόξῃ, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ τὰ μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων κακὰ εἶναι δόκει, τὰ δὲ ἀγαθά. *Theodoret.* hæret. Fab. l. 1.

† Si autem Papa erraret præcipiendo vitia, vel prohibendo virtutes, teneretur Eccleſia credere vitia eſſe bona, & virtutes malas, niſi vellet contra conſcientiam peccare. De Sum. Pontif. l. 4. c. 5.

ciſion, I ſay, of that Great Man) in his Excellent Book of *the Rights of Peace and War*, † *God himſelf cannot change this Law of Natural Goodneſs, he cannot make that which is intrinſically evil to be no evil.* And the Reaſon is, becauſe then he would not be God, for his Nature would be chang'd, which is a thing utterly impoſſible, and the very ſuppoſition of it is to be abhorred.

† Lib. 1. c. 1.

The Great *Gallick* Philoſopher, who diſcourſes ſo admirably concerning the *Moral Virtues*, was enclin'd to think, that they were not founded on immoveable Reaſons: for in ſome places of his *Epiſtles* and in his *Anſwers*, where he holds that Goodneſs as well as Truth eternally depended on the *Divine Will* and its free determination, he ſeems to mean that God could have determin'd them otherwiſe, if he had pleas'd: and ſo, that which is now Good, might have been Evil. But this miſtaken Notion of this Learned Man aroſe from his not conſidering and remembring, that the *Will* of God is alwaies the ſame as to its real intrinſick nature, and therefore what it now is, it ever was, and can never be otherwiſe, and conſequently Goodneſs is unvariable, and that which is Good now can't be Evil at another time. Which if that Excellent Perſon had bore in his mind, he would not have argu'd from God's *Will* in that manner which he ſeems to do.

But I am ſorry to find that in our own Nation likewiſe there are thoſe who oppoſe the Intrinſick Nature of Moral Goodneſs, and render it dubious and arbitrary. Among theſe ought to be mention'd in the firſt place that known Perſon, in whoſe *State*

of

of Nature (which he laies down as the Foundation of his whole Syſtem) nothing is virtuous or vitious, juſt or unjuſt; for he holds that theſe ariſe only from Compact and Society. The *Magiſtrate* is Mr. *Hobbes*'s *God*, the *Prince* is the maker of Good and Evil, and he can unmake them when he pleaſes. Which is ſaid well enough for ſuch a Philoſopher as holds a *Man* is nothing elſe but *Body* or *Carkaſe*.

Another † Learned Writer (tho' a profeſſed Enemy to the former) reſolves all Moral Philoſophy into *Geometrical and Mechanick Principles*: which perhaps was deſign'd on purpoſe by that profound and ſagacious Perſon to convince ſome in an Age of *Mathematicks*. He is follow'd and vouch'd by another, * who undertakes to Improve him, and to thruſt this Conceit on the World, that *Experimental Obſervation* is the Standard of all Goodneſs and Morality: but I believe you will agree with me in this, that this is ſpoken rather like a *Virtuoſo* than a *Divine*.

† De Legibus Naturæ Diſquiſitio Philoſoph.

* *Demonſtration of the Divine Authority of the Law of Nature.* And his *Account of Platonick Philoſophy.*

There is another, who in his *Brief Diſquiſition of the Law of Nature*, hath refin'd upon both the former Writers, and makes it his work to ſhew that the proof of Natural Laws or Dictates of Reaſon, can be drawn only from the uſe of our *Senſes*. He holds, that *by the motion impreſs'd on the Organs of our Senſes, God delineates the Ideas or Images of all Moral Actions on our minds*. He thinks there is no Notion of Moral Goodneſs or Evil but what is communicated to us by theſe, and conſequently it is not *Innate*. Tho' by the bye it is well worth our obſerving, that he freely grants, that ‡ *Beaſts* derive not all their knowledge from their *Senſes*, but are born

‡ Chap. 2. § 20.

born with peculiar *appetites and inclinations, and have natural Inſtincts, or Impreſſions ſtampt by God on their very natures.* So unkind are theſe Philoſophick Maſters to their own *Species*, as to grudge it the Prerogative and Excellency of a *Brute*. They not only degrade mankind, but thruſt them below the rank of Irrational Beings. But if you would know the particular way how Moral Sentiments are derived to us, they tell you, this is the method, and they admit of no other; *God makes external Cauſes operate on our bodily Organs, and by this operation and motion, in a certain and determinate manner, we attain to a notion of what is Vitious or Virtuous.* It is by the influence of outward objects, and them only, that all Principles of Morality come to be known to us. But to diſprove this, and at the ſame time to baffle the like Doctrine of another late Author,

Firſt, I ask, how can *General Notions* of Morality be produc'd by the *External Senſes?* Is there any cognation at all between *Abſtract Ideas of Goodneſs* and mere *Bodily Objects?* Can a Man imagine that Univerſal and Complex Apprehenſions can be the off-ſpring of the particular matters of Corporeal Senſe?

Secondly, if this Author and his Friends be in the right, then thoſe Beings that are deſtitute of Bodily Senſe can have no Notion of Good and Evil. Suppoſing *Angels* to be Incorporeal, Morality is a thing not known to them; nor is it known to *Separate Souls*, nor *Saints* in Heaven, nay not to *God* himſelf; becauſe theſe are exempted from Bodily Senſes, and conſequently they are not capable of underſtanding any Moral Propoſitions. *Thirdly*,

Thirdly, this Opinion, that Natural Motion produces Moral Goodneſs, is ſuch a confounding and jumbling together of *Phyſicks* and *Ethicks*, that none who have clear and diſtinct conceptions of things will admit of it.

Fourthly and laſtly, this Opinion makes all Morality contingent and uncertain, for all Natural and Bodily Motion (on which he holds it depends) is ſo: at one time or other it varies. External and Corporeal Cauſes are ſhifting and fickle: Objects work on us differently, yea the operations of the ſame Objects are not alwaies the ſame; and therefore Moral Goodneſs, which is founded on theſe, is no fix'd thing, but is unſteady and floating: we know not where to have it, according to this Author. Theſe are the Reaſons why I cannot approve of this New Method, which he hath taken to demonſtrate the Truth of Morality, or rather to caſhier and defeat it. Which he chuſes rather to do, than to acknowledge any Inbred Principle in the Soul of Man.

I could have wiſh'd that Mr. *Norris* had not ſo contemptibly reflected on the Inbred Notions and Characters of Truth and Goodneſs on Mens minds, as to reproach them with the Title of * *mere Jargon and unintelligible Cant*; eſpecially ſeeing one that hath larded *ſome of his Writings* with ſo many unintelligible high-flown Strains, and *Platonick Gibberiſh*, (and even in the preſent matter which is before us talks of *the preſentialneſs of the Ideal World to our Souls, which is the Divine Eſſence, wherein we ſee and underſtand all things*) might have been more favourable in his Cenſure.

* *Reflections on the Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding.*

Another late Ingenious Author will by no means hear of Natural and Congenite Principles of Morality, but roundly tells us in these expreſs words, that † *Men come to the knowledge of Moral Principles and Duties by Tradition: their Fathers taught them them, and their Grandfathers their Fathers, and ſo up to Adam the common Parent of all.* And a little after he uſes ſuch language as this, *Moral Duties are convey'd to all the World as Spinning and Weaving*, and ſuch like inventions. Whereby he confounds the Notions of *Natural* and *Reveal'd Religion*, and yet it is obſervable that in thoſe *Dialogues* he firſt diſtinctly Diſcourſes of *Natural Religion*, and then of *Reveal'd*. Whence it is evident that he not only contradicts himſelf, but mightily gratifies the *Theiſt*, whom he hath to deal with, and pretends to confute: but he not only baulks one of the greateſt and ſtrongeſt proofs we have of the Truth of Moral Notions and Offices, but he ridicules all Morality, by ſetting it on no other bottom than what the Trade of *Weavers* and *Spinſters* hath. Thus we pull down that with our own hands which we pretend to build up; and even whilſt ſome among us are confuting of *Deiſm*, they promote and advance it.

† *Conference with a Theiſt.* 2d Part p. 36, 37.

There is another Writer yet behind, who ſeems to ſhew himſelf as backward to own a Natural Principle of Religion, as any of the forenam'd ones; for he ſticks not to ſay, that * *there are no Notions naturally imprinted on the mind; for then*, ſaith he, *Children and Ideots would have them.* But it is certain he might as ſtrongly have argued, that there is no Reaſon or Prudence in mankind, becauſe neither

* *Eſſay of Humane Underſtanding*, Book 1. Chap. 2.

ther *Children* nor *Ideots* are obſerv'd to exerciſe theſe. The *Logick* is every whit as good. And in another place, conformably to his denial of all Practical Principles in the mind of Man, he ſpeaks very doubtfully of *Virtue* it ſelf; † *The name or ſound of* VIRTUE, ſaith he, *is hard to be underſtood, it is liable to much Uncertainty in its ſignification: and the thing it ſtands for is much contended about, and difficult to be known.* And again, VIRTUES *and* SINS *are words of uncertain ſignification, and among different Men ſtand for different things.* p. 24. At another time he confeſſes, that * *he makes the Law, whereby we judge of* Virtue *and* Vice, *to be nothing elſe but the Conſent of Private Men.* And in the ſame place he is poſitive, that *the meaſure of what is every where call'd and eſteem'd* Virtue *and* Vice, *is Approbation or Diſlike, Praiſe or Blame.* And again, ‡ *Nothing elſe but that which hath the allowance of Publick Eſteem is Virtue.* Which words (tho' he attempts to correct them in a later Edition) I am *ſomewhat enclin'd* to underſtand according to the plain and obvious meaning of them, and the rather, becauſe it is *probable*, that as in *other* very conſiderable Points, ſo *here* he Symbolizes with the Philoſopher of *Malmsbury*, in whoſe ſteps he affects to tread, and borrows ſome of his Thoughts. For as he follows him in his Opinion of *the Neceſſity of only One Fundamental Article of Chriſtian Faith*, and in his Notion of *Thinking matter*, and particularly in that of the likelyhood or poſſibility of the *Materiality of Humane Souls*, and of their tendency (on that Principle) to *Mortality*, and in his *Contempt of ſome parts of the Holy Scripture*, and in his avow'd

† *Eſſay*, B. 1. c. 3. p. 23.

* *Eſſay*, B. 2. c. 28.

‡ *Edition the* Firſt.

disbelief of the *Reſurrection of the ſame Body*, and in his ridiculing of the *receiv'd Explication of* † *the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity*, and in his general favouring of *Scepticiſm* and *Infidelity*, and in his denial of *Natural* and *Inbred Notions*; ſo likewiſe he ſeems to be an humble imitator of the foreſaid Philoſopher, in his belief of *the precarious and arbitrary nature of Morality*: tho' it is true in a flouriſh he pretends at another time, that *Morality as well as Mathematicks may be demonſtrated.* Surely that Propoſition aforemention'd, *viz. Nothing elſe but that which hath the allowance of publick Eſteem is Virtue*, may paſs for *the Leviathan Epitomiz'd.*

† *Laſt Letter to the Biſhop of Worceſter, pag.* 361. 362. 363.

And here by the way I would obſerve this to you, that the Perſons who ſpeak contemptibly of *Reveal'd Religion* or any part of it, are, if you look narrowly into them, and their Writings, as deficient in their apprehenſions and eſteem of that which is *Natural* and merely *Moral*, which yet they ſo much pretend to cry up. Whilſt they ſtrike at the *Principles* of *Faith*, and the *Fundamental Articles* and *Myſteries* of *Chriſtianity*, they cut the Sinews and take away the props of *Morality* it ſelf, and diſcard the true Grounds and Reaſons of it. Which ſhews that their deſign and project is againſt Virtue in general, and that their aim is to put all out of order, to tranſpoſe and ranverſe what ever hath any reſpect to *Religion*, and to confound every thing belonging to it, and thereby to expoſe Relgion it ſelf, and to make ſport for the Atheiſtical and Scoffing part of the World.

The greater reaſon therefore is there that we ſhould be ſettled in our minds concerning theſe things,

things, and that we ſhould confirm and eſtabliſh our ſelves more and more in this neceſſary and important Truth, (which I have endeavour'd to make good) that there are Eternal and Immutable Reaſons of Good and Evil, that there is in all Immoral Actions a repugnancy to a Rule of Right in our own breaſts, as well as in the mind of our Creator. This is the true account of Moral Righteouſneſs, namely, that it is built on the Nature of God, and of Humane Souls, and the Univerſal Behaviour of Mankind. So that, to ſpeak plainly, thoſe that deſignedly ſet themſelves againſt the Doctrine of *Inbred Principles of Good and Evil*, detract from the *Divinity* it ſelf, and from the Eſſential Nature and Guiſe of *Mankind*. And we may aſſure our ſelves that ſuch a Perſwaſion is the moſt debauching Principle in the World, and that thoſe who wilfully and obſtinately maintain it have a very ill deſign upon Mankind. Which was the only ground of my ſo *free* and *plain dealing* with them, for 'tis in vain to Palliate where we deſign to Cure.

It remains that in the laſt place I ſhould ſhew the *Virtue* and *Efficacy*, the *Influence* and *Uſefulneſs* of the Premiſes: which might be done in ſeveral Particulars, but I will offer only this one Practical Inference from the whole. Let the Doctrine diſcours'd of be a mighty *Incentive to all Virtue and Goodneſs*. Seeing theſe are conſonant to our Natural Principles and diſpoſitions, we have all the reaſon imaginable to comply with them. Why ſhould we contradict our own Propenſions, and be Rebels to our Selves? As it is in Natural Motion, not *Crooked* lines, but *Right* and *Streight* ones are aim'd at: ſo

it is in Morals, Man's Reasonable Nature aims at that which is his *Direct* and plain duty: and when he deviates from this *Right* path, he acts against his true Primitive temper and genius. Let us consider then, that we ought to be Virtuous, because our very Nature obliges us to it. We are invited to be Just and Good by something that is within us, and by the intrinsick Beauty of Goodness it self. We should prize Religion and a Holy Life, because they commend themselves to us by their own inherent and abstract worth. Let us not be backward in the practice of Virtue, seeing its own native excellency encourages us to it. Those were Curious and Choise words of a † Gentile Writer, *This is one great help and advantage*, saith he, *to Virtue, to be made good*, ἐκ παρασκευῆς συγγενοῦς, *by a Congenite Preparation:* and such is the Inbred Principle, that I have been speaking of, whereby we are naturally enclin'd to live Virtuously. For tho' (as was said in the beginning of this Discourse) by the Depravity deriv'd from our First Progenitors, both our Understandings and Wills are miserably shatter'd; yet these Original Impressions are not effaced, because they are of the very *Nature of Man* as he is a Rational Creature. Therefore these cannot be wholly expung'd out of Mens hearts, they are the Indelible Stamp of God on every Soul. And the more conformable any Man's life and actions are to them, the more clear and bright is his apprehension and judgment concerning the truth and reality, as well as the excellency of them.

† Dio. Cass. Hist. Rom. lib. 44.

Wherefore let us descend into our own breasts, and be acquainted with our selves: and by that means

means we ſhall come to find in our minds a Stock of Principles, which will very much endear Religion to us: for as it will hugely pleaſe us to ſee a great part of our Religion born in us and bred up with us, ſo it will be a powerful motive to us to exert thoſe Virtues which are ſo fitted to our Natures, and, as I may ſay, were Calculated for them. Wherefore having this prevalent *Incitement*, let us not be cold and indifferent in the practice of Righteouſneſs and Holineſs; let us manfully break through all obſtacles and impediments, and let us be vigorous and zealous in the waies of Religion, even of that which God by an Inſite Principle dictates to us: and the rather, becauſe this is ſo conſiderable a ſtep to and a part of that Higher Strain and Improvement, which we are *chiefly* to be concern'd for, namely, the Inſtitution of the Bleſſed *Jeſus*, our conformity to which is abſolutely neceſſary in order to our Salvation and Happineſs. To conclude, let us be *ſtedfaſt* and *unmoveable* in our duty, ſeeing the *Principles* and *Reaſons* of it are *ſuch*. And let it evidently appear in our lives, that the eſteem and love we have for Goodneſs and Virtue are not Paſſion, but Reaſon, not Imagination, but Solid Judgment.

THE END.

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